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Abstract
We advance the hypothesis that cultural values such as high work ethic and thrift, “the Protestant
ethic” according to Max Weber, may have been diﬀused long before the Reformation, thereby importantly
aﬀecting the pre-industrial growth record. The source of pre-Reformation Protestant ethic, according to
the proposed theory, was the Catholic Order of Cistercians. Using county-level data for England we find
empirically that the frequency of Cistercian monasteries influenced county-level comparative development
until 1801; that is, long after the Dissolution of the Monasteries. The pre-industrial development of
England may thus have been propelled by a process of growth through cultural change.
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1 Introduction
In what is surely one of the most famous works in all of social science, Max Weber (1905) argued that the
Protestant Reformation was instrumental in facilitating the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. More
specifically, Weber argued that Protestantism, in contrast to Catholicism, commends the virtues of hard
work and thrift. These values, which Weber famously refers to as the “Protestant ethic”, laid the foundation
for the eventual rise of modern capitalism. A noteworthy study by Becker and Woessmann (2009) suggests
that Weber was right, albeit for the wrong reasons: Protestants did not prosper as a result of their work
ethic, say; rather, they prospered because instruction in reading the Bible generated the human capital so
crucial to economic prosperity. Using data for Prussia, where some regions converted to Protestantism while
others remained Catholic, Becker and Woessmann document the strength of the human capital channel. In
fact, Becker and Woessmann argue that the human capital mechanism can account for most of the diﬀerence
in comparative development between the Protestant and Catholic regions of Prussia.1
Nevertheless, one does not have to reject the original Weber thesis in order to support the human capital
story. Landes (1999) is a case in point. While acknowledging the human capital mechanism, he maintains
the importance of the Protestant ethic, both on empirical grounds (Protestant merchants and manufacturers
played a leading role in banking, industry and trade) and on theoretical grounds (the Reformation created a
new kind of man: rational, ordered, diligent and productive). More formally, using the World Values Survey,
McCleary and Barro (2006) make probable that Weber was in fact right in emphasizing a link between
religion on the one hand and work ethic on the other.2 Nevertheless, it is clearly a diﬃcult task to separately
identify the importance of the human capital mechanism and the traditional “Weber mechanism”, as both
have arguably been at work simultaneously in the wake of the Reformation.
The present paper oﬀers an attempt to separate the impact of the Weber mechanism and the human cap-
ital mechanism. We document below that the cultural virtues emphasized by Weber had a pre-Reformation
origin in the religious Order of the Cistercians; a Catholic order which spread across England during the
12th century. We hypothesize that the Cistercians had a long term impact on development by encouraging
a greater appreciation of hard work and wealth accumulation in local populations. That is, we argue the
Cistercians encouraged growth by instigating the kind of cultural change that Weber attributed to Protes-
tantism. Using cross-county data for England for the period 1377-1801, we find strong empirical support for
a growth enhancing impact of Cistercian presence. Since the Cistercians did not encourage human capital
accumulation, our findings suggests that the original Weber thesis, stressing the importance of cultural values
like hard work and thrift, holds considerable explanatory power with respect to the pre-industrial growth
1Cantoni (2009), however, finds no eﬀects of Protestantism on city growth across the German Lands of the Holy Roman
Empire prior to industrialization.
2Thrift is not significant in their specification.
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record of England.
The Cistercian order, a Benedictine oﬀshoot, was established in France in 1098 as a reformist movement
with the aim of returning to the literal observance of the “Rule of St. Benedict”. They rejected the
developments the Benedictines had undergone and tried to reproduce life exactly as it had been in St.
Benedict’s time; in fact, they often ventured beyond it in austerity. Put diﬀerently, the salient feature in
the reform was a return to hard manual labor and the restrain from consumption (Kieser 1987). This meant
that within the walls of the Cistercian monasteries one would find cultural values similar to those which,
promulgated by the Protestant Reformation centuries later, is thought to have assisted the rise of capitalism
outside the monastic walls. Several scholars have noted that the simplicity of the Order’s lifestyle and their
pursuit of wealth were in fact early manifestations of “the Protestant ethic” (e.g., Baumol 1990, p. 906;
Collins 1986, p. 54; Kieser 1987, p. 116); Weber (1958, p. 118-19) himself singled out the Cistercians as
encompassing values with a clear antecedent to the Protestant ethic.
We hypothesize that the cultural values embedded in the Cistercian order diﬀused to the local populations.
Hence we argue that virtues associated with the Protestant movement started to spread in England long
before Martin Luther posted his theses on the door of the All Saints’ Church in Wittenberg. Of course,
the cultural influence from the Cistercians was not immediate. Initially, the Cistercians may only have
“convinced” a (potentially very) small group of people to “adopt” their attitudes towards hard work and
thrift. But in a Malthusian setting work ethic and thrift translates into economic success, and ultimately into
reproductive success. To the extent that cultural values carry over from parent to oﬀspring, a cumulative
process of growth through cultural change can be envisioned. If the pervasiveness of Protestant-type cultural
values increases, this will stimulate work eﬀort, investments and technological change; in turn, this works to
encourage population growth and, as a consequence of selection, cultural change.
We construct a model that illustrates this cumulative process. To fix ideas, we focus on how Cistercians
may have influenced the attitude towards hard work and thereby macroeconomic development. Using the
model, we demonstrate that an initially small group of dynasties featuring a relatively strong preference for
work eﬀort could plausibly have come to dominate the population within the span of 500 years. Moreover, we
show that small diﬀerences in the initial rate of “conversion” to a high work ethic could result in considerable
cross-county variation in cultural values in the course of centuries. Finally, we derive an estimable equation
from the model.
In order to proxy the initial cultural influence from the Cistercians on local populations, we employ
information on the historic location of English Cistercian abbeys at the county level. With this data in hand,
we proceed to document that the intensity of Cistercian presence left an important imprint on comparative
development across English counties until 1801; that is, long after the Dissolution of the Monasteries, which
took place between 1536 and 1540. As we focus on the pre-industrial period, and in keeping with our
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theoretical model, we rely on population density as our measure of productivity; in doing so we follow the
lead of, among others, Ashraf and Galor (2009). Specifically, we show that, conditional on relevant exogenous
controls, English counties with a higher share of Cistercian monasteries (as a fraction of all religious houses)
experienced faster population growth during the period 1377-1801.
We believe the most plausible explanation for this finding is that the Cistercians influenced local cultural
values, which subsequently took hold in the population. These new values in turn stimulated growth through
attendant changes in work eﬀort, investment behavior and technological progress. While we cannot document
a link between Cistercian presence and pre-industrial cultural values across England, we are able to present
evidence that the historic share of Cistercian abbeys is strongly correlated with contemporary work ethic
and thrift at the regional level in England, as measured by the World Values Survey.
Naturally, a priori there could be other viable explanations for the observed link between intensity of
Cistercian presence and population growth over the period in question. Perhaps this particular religious
order simply managed to locate in areas with high growth potential; perhaps they influenced growth via
international trade; or maybe the observed association is best motivated by technological change or human
capital accumulation. We address these alternative narratives below. But we are led to the conclusion that
they are unable to account for the observed relationship between the intensity of Cistercian presence and
county-level population growth.
Our analysis contributes to several strands of literature. By demonstrating an impact from religious
orders on economic development, we contribute to a literature which examines the religion-prosperity nexus
(e.g., Landes 1999; Barro and McCleary 2003; McCleary and Barro 2006; Cavalcanti, Parente and Zhao
2007; Becker and Woessmann 2009; Cantoni 2009). In addition, by documenting a long lasting impact
from Cistercian monasteries, our work contributes to a recent literature which suggests that past events
(treatments) can permanently aﬀect economic outcomes if they influence norms of behavior and/or culture
(e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2009; Tabellini 2010).
The closest precursor to the argument developed below is the work of Clark (2007), which also takes as
point of departure that cultural attributes, such as a high work ethic, breed economic success, and ultimately
reproductive success in a Malthusian setting. Clark’s theory is based on endogenous factors: The rich became
rich because of certain favorable traits (cultural or perhaps even genetic); their children inherited these traits,
and because the rich had such staggering reproductive success, their oﬀspring were forced to move downward
in the social hierarchy, implying that the “positive” traits eventually spread to the entire population. In
a similar vein, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) develop a theory of endogenous preference formation whereby
cultural virtues conducive to growth flourish in parts of the population and facilitate a growth take-oﬀ. In
contrast to Clark, however, Doepke and Zilibotti argue that the new cultural values emerged in the middle
class, and not among the initially rich. We diﬀer from both Clark and Doepke and Zilibotti in emphasizing a
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shock to cultural values: the settlement of the Cistercians. This allows us to test our argument statistically.
In contrast to Doepke and Zilibotti, but similarly to Clark, we emphasize the reproductive advantage of high
work ethic dynasties in explaining the diﬀusion of cultural values. In practise, deliberate investments and
diﬀerential fertility probably both contributed to the diﬀusion of work ethic and thrift.
Finally, our analysis is related to evolutionary growth theory, as pioneered by Galor and Moav (2002).
Galor and Moav demonstrate how dynasties with greater preference for child quality, relative to child quan-
tity, hold a selective advantage in a Malthusian setting and come to dominate the population. Moreover, the
theory predicts that the positive selection of quality oriented individuals stimulated long-run economic de-
velopment. Similarly, the theory advanced below predicts that the epoch of Malthusian stagnation involved
selection of individuals with a high work ethic, thus importantly influencing comparative development in
England during the pre-industrial era.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theory, including the formal model,
while Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. Section 4 provides a conclusion.
2 Theory
This section develops a theory of how Cistercians may have left a lasting imprint on comparative development
in England. The following subsection provides details on Cistercian monks. We discuss their values, how
these values manifested themselves in terms of work eﬀort, capital accumulation and technological change,
and how their values may have spread to the local population.
We argue that a major reason why the presence of Cistercian monasteries is apparent in comparative
development long after the Order’s disbandment is that they instigated a process of cultural change. To
clarify how this process may have played out, we develop a model of growth through cultural change in
Section 2.2. The model elucidates how an initially modest “cultural shock” to a population cumulates over
time in a Malthusian setting, ultimately leaving a significant imprint on the growth record. The model also
allows us to gauge the speed of the process of cultural change.
2.1 Cistercian Values
The Cistercian order was founded in 1098 in France; the first Cistercian monastery in England was founded
in 1128 (Cooke 1893; Donkin 1963). During the 12th Century the Order spread rapidly across England, cf.
Figure 1. By the end of the 14th century the expansion of the Order had essentially ceased. Hence, from
the perspective of our regression analysis below, which involve the time period from 1377 onwards, we can
treat Cistercian settlements as predetermined.
There is little doubt that the Cistercians held beliefs which were later to be associated with the Protestant
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Figure 1: Frequency of founding years of Cistercian monasteries In England.
ethic. By seeking to return to a literal interpretation of the Rule of St. Benedict, the small book written in
the sixth century by its namesake, they stressed the trinity of prayer, work and study, as well as the values
of practicality, adaptability, simplicity and moderation (Hill 1968, p. 3). The Exordium Cistercii, written
in the 1120s, and the statutes promulgated at the general chapter of 1134, stated that the monks were to
work hard and live “from the labour of their own hands, from cultivation and from their flocks”. They were
also to live frugally, and were not permitted to have any possessions “contrary to monastic purity” such as
parish churches, the tithes of other men’s labour, dependent peasants, mills, ovens, or other income sources
attached to the land. Hence, it is no surprise that Baumol (1990, p. 906) suggests that the monks of the
Order of Cistercians may have embodied an earlier “Protestant ethic”: “Puritanical, at least in the earlier
years, in their self-proclaimed adherence to simplicity in personal lifestyle while engaged in dedicated pursuit
of wealth, they may perhaps represent an early manifestation of elements of ‘the Protestant ethic’”. Collins
(1986, p. 54) is slightly more direct when he notes that the Cistercians: “had the Protestant ethic without
Protestantism”.3
The simplicity of the Cistercians was thus only a liturgical simplicity, replacing long days of ritual with
short prayers that could be said in pauses from labor (Bouchard 1991; Hill 1968). Moreover, “useless” labor,
such as painting pictures, decorating books, breeding useless animals, etc. was banned (Kieser 1987). Some
3Kiefer (1987, p. 116) makes the same observation.
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have suggested that they were attempting to reduce the need for manual labor in order to leave more time
for prayer (Bloch 1935; Gimpel 1976; Ovitt 1986; Landes 1999). Whatever the case, from the very beginning
the Cistercians were involved in the rapidly developing economic practices of the 12th century, and were in
some cases initiators of these practices. Moreover, the monks’ asceticism, by keeping down consumption,
drove up levels of investment (Kiefer 1987; Baumol 1990).
Kaelber (1998) points out that Weber himself saw monastic asceticism as a clear precursor to ascetic
Protestantism: the key driving force behind European capitalism according to Weber. More specifically,
as argued by Weber (1958, p. 118-19): “In the rules of St. Benedict, even more so in the case of the
monks of Cluny and the Cistercians...[Christian asceticism] has become a systematically developed method of
rational life conduct, with the goal to overcome the status naturae, to free man from the power of irrational
impulses and his dependence on the world and on nature...It attempted to subject man under the supremacy
of purposive will, to bring his action under constant self-control with a careful consideration of their ethical
consequences. Thus it trained the monk, objectively, as a worker in the service of the Kingdom of God, and
thereby further, subjectively, assured the salvation of his soul. . . [T]he end of this asceticism was to be able to
lead an alert, intelligent life: the most urgent task the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment, the
most important means was to bring order into the conduct of its adherents. All these important points are
emphasized in the rules of Catholic monasticism as strongly as in the principles of conduct of the Calvinists.”
Hence the idea that the Cistercians held values close to those promulgated by the Protestant Reformation
has a long and distinguished tradition.4
The emphasis on hard work and thrift made the Cistercians entrepreneurial and ultimately very successful
economically (Baumol 1990). They contributed much as agriculturists and as horse and cattle breeders. Their
major contribution was the introduction of the grange system, whereby land was held in compact blocks, in
contrast to the usual fragmented and unenclosed village holdings (Donkin 1963). Another contribution seems
to have been advanced irrigation techniques, thus predating Rowland Vaughan’s famous popularization of
these methods by centuries.5 Moreover, their high level of agricultural technology was matched by their
industrial technology. Every monastery had a model factory, often as large as the church, with waterpower
to drive the machinery (Gimpel 1976). This power was used for crushing wheat, sieving flour, fulling cloth
and tanning (Baumol 1990). The Cistercians are known to have been skilled metallurgists (Gimpel 1976).
The Cistercian monastic system was one based on the principle of kinship, and thus Cistercian work
practices and technology seem to have spread easily from house to house (Donkin 1978). These values
4As Weber points out, similar values were found among the Cluniacs. The impact of the Cluny order has received scant
attention in the literature in comparison with the Cistercians. Yet, as we shall see, they too seem to have left a mark (albeit not
as statistically robust as the Cistercians) on pre-industrial growth in England, conceivably for the same reasons the Cistercians
influenced growth.
5Vaughan’s Golden Valley was actually located in an area where the Cistercians had held extensive estates prior to the
Dissolution (Cook, Stearne and Williamson 2003).
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in turn spread into the local area partly due to the Cistercian practice of incorporating illiterate peasant
lay brothers (known as conversi) for agricultural labor (Berman 2000). Lay brothers were bound by vows
of chastity and obedience to their abbot, but were otherwise permitted to follow a less demanding form of
Cistercian life. Work on Cistercian granges were also carried out by various classes of secular laborers. These
included servi (servants), mercenarii (hired laborers), familiares (workers with intermediate status between
hired workmen and lay brothers) and donate or oblate (pious laymen exchanging work for support). The
exact fraction of lay brothers to these other types of labor is diﬃcult to determine, but the latter seem to
have become increasingly important at the turn of the 13th century (Noell 2006). Another important group
of settlers in the abbeys were the corrodians, who spent their years of retirement there. Moreover, settled
communities, including shopkeepers, formed outside the monasteries (Williams 1970). In this manner, the
ways of the Cistercians spread beyond the Order itself.
An ideal check of this would be to study the correlation between Cistercian presence and preindustrial
ethical values, like work ethic and thrift. Unfortunately, data constraints prevent us from carrying out such
a check. What we can do instead is to study the relationship between the intensity of historical Cistercian
presence and the pervasiveness of (proxies for) contemporary Protestant ethic across England.
In order to quantify diﬀerences in work ethic across countries, McCleary and Barro (2006) use the fraction
of World Values Survey (WVS) respondents who indicated that they think that valuing “hard work” is an
important trait for children to learn at home. To measure thrift they calculate the frequency of respondents
indicating that “thrift, saving money and things” is an important trait for children to learn at home. These
variables are also available for the United Kingdom in the WVS 2005. Unfortunately, it is only possible to
disaggregate down to the regional level.6 The “intensity” of Cistercian presence in a geographical area is
proxied as the number of Cistercian monasteries relative to the total number of religious houses in the area.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the correlation between the intensity of Cistercian presence and work ethic and
thrift, respectively. As expected, the three variables are positively correlated; Cistercian presence has a
correlation of 0.62 with “work ethic” and 0.42 with “thrift”. With only eight observations, an OLS regression
returns a statistically significant (at the five percent level) correlation between work ethic and Cistercian
presence. Statistical significance is not attained (at conventional levels) in the context of thrift; but the
positive association between Cistercian presence and fraction of regional respondents emphasizing thrift is
visually discernible and positive. Taken together, this exercise provides some support of our hypothesis that
the Cistercian “treatment” influenced cultural values across England.
6The data only have regional identifyers. We have also contacted the British Values Survey, and the same holds for this
survey.
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Figure 2: Cross regional correlation between Cistercian intensity and contemporary work ethic (source World
Values Survey).
2.2 A Model of Growth through Cultural Change
In order to think more formally about how the ways of the Cistercians spread beyond the Order itself,
and the ensuing macroeconomic impact, consider the following overlapping generations model for a closed
economy in the process of development. Time is discrete and extends to infinity,  = 0 1 2∞.
People live for at most two periods: childhood and adulthood. During childhood individuals receive
consumption from their unique parent; for simplicity of exposition, we assume that individuals only consume
during period one.7 If adulthood is reached, an individual decides on work eﬀort and then reproduces.
While each parent produces a fixed number of oﬀspring, nutritional intake (deterministically) determines
how many survive to adulthood. Hence, while fertility is exogenous, the number of surviving oﬀspring (and
thus population growth) is endogenous on account of the link between nutritional intake and the fraction of
children that makes it into adulthood.
Cultural values are crudely represented by utility weights. Specifically, “high work ethic” dynasties are
identified as dynasties that attach relatively low disutility to eﬀort, and the impact from the Cistercians are
conceptualized as a shock to the utility weights of a subset of the individuals. Moreover, we assume that in
the absence of a cultural shock the oﬀspring adopts the preferences of their unique parent. Needless to say
these are strong assumptions. Yet the point of the model is not to assess the generality of the hypothesized
7This could be viewed as an implicit assumption that parental consumption only involves a fixed minimum consumption re-
quirement, which we then for expositional simplicity normalize to zero. With a positive (exogenous) level of parental subsistence
consumption we would have to take into account that there might be situations (i.e., parameter configurations and population
levels) under which dynasties die out. We have no particular interest in studying this sort of scenario, which motivates the
normalization.
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Figure 3: Cross regional correlation between Cistercian intensity and contemporary thrift (source World
Values Survey).
trajectory, whereby a shock to the preferences of a small subset of individuals eventually causes a proliferation
of these new preferences in the population at large. The point is rather to examine the implications of such
a trajectory, which we a priori hypothesize is relevant for pre-industrial England, and then subsequently
confront with data, and potentially reject.8
By focusing on the impact of changes in the attitude to hard work we suppress changes in cultural
attitudes towards saving and investment; i.e., thrift. It is worth observing, however, that while the model
focuses on the work ethic of individuals, similar results would likely arise if we instead examined thrift.
As long as thrift implies a greater earnings potential, groups with high thriftiness will be selected in the
Malthusian setting.9
A final observation worth making is that in the canonical Malthusian macro model fertility is endogenously
determined, while child mortality is suppressed or implicit (see Ashraf and Galor 2009). Here it is the other
way around. We follow this alternative route because it allows us to capture the taste for hard work in a
8 In a more detailed model one would want to study the conditions under which preferences are in fact maintained over time
within a dynasty, and distinguish between men and women in order to study matching. But it should be clear that the reduced
form outcome studied below may well be viable in this richer environment if diﬀerences prevail across dynasties in perceived
benefits of high work ethic values (for which reason such values are promoted by some dynasties but not by others; Doepke
and Zillibotti 2008), and if there is suﬃcient assortative matching in the marriage market such that individuals with identical
values choose to set up a family together (Becker, 1973). In such an environment one can think about the “Cistercian shock” as
being represented by a change in perceived benefits to a high work ethic rather than by directly modifying preferences of some
individuals. In order to maintain tractability, while studying the dynamic general equilibrium of the economy in the presence
of cultural heterogeneity, we ignore this kind of micro-level behavior however interesting it may be in its own right.
9Becker (1980) explores a dynamic economy where agents diﬀer in terms of the rate of time preference; i.e., in terms of
“thrift”. In the long run the most patient dynasty ends up “owning” the economy. Below we demonstrate a similar result in
that dynasties with greater work ethics will end up dominating the population.
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convenient way, while at the same time retaining the basic properties of the Malthusian framework as well
as simplicity and tractability.
2.2.1 Individual’s optimization problem
Individuals derive disutility from work eﬀort and utility from the number of surviving oﬀspring, with utility
given as
 =  log (1− ) + log ()  (1)
In equation (1)  ∈ (0 1) is work eﬀort,   1 is the (fixed) number of children coming into existence and
 is the fraction that survives to adulthood. The parameter   0 captures individuals’ distaste for hard
work. It can thus be seen as a simple manifestation of the work ethic of the individual, which we will think
of as a cultural value that typically is fixed but may undergo occasional “mutation” in a population. In the
absence of shocks to preferences, we assume children inherit the cultural value from their parent. For now
we consider a population where everyone shares the same work ethic, . Finally, observe that since  is
ultimately linked to consumption the utility function is in a reduced form sense defined over consumption
and work eﬀort.
A higher level of eﬀort allows for more income, which in turn facilitates a higher level of child consumption,
, according to
 =  (2)
where  is potential per capita income. Finally, we assume that the survival rate to adulthood depends on
child consumption in the following way
 = min
½
  1
¾
 (3)
where the parameter   0 is a reference consumption level.10 As consumption per child falls below , child
mortality rises. Equation (3) is meant to capture that insuﬃcient nutrition during early childhood weakens
the oﬀspring and thereby (deterministically) elevates the mortality rate. In this way we capture the notion of
a Malthusian “positive check”: In periods of plenty  will rise thus allowing for more surviving oﬀspring;
vice versa when income falls.11
10Assuming that maximum survival is 100% is a simplification. Nothing would change if we, at the costs of additional
notation, were to assume a maximum survival rate of, say, ¯  1 instead; that is, assume that  = min {[]  ¯}.
11Kelly and O’Grada (2008) find that low real wages caused by bad harvests led to increased mortality in England during the
14th and 15th century. This link is however weakened from the 16th century onwards, quite possibly due to the introduction
of the Poor Law.
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Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3) and  ∈ (0 1)  we find that
∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩

 if  ≥ (1 + )
1
1+ if   (1 + )
 ∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 if  ≥ (1 + )
1
1+ if   (1 + )
 (4)
The solution in (4) shows that for all , ∗ ∈
³
0 11+
i
 That is, it can never be optimal to supply an eﬀort
level larger than the upper bound 11+  This is so because with   (1 + ) potential income is so high
that providing an eﬀort level at 11+ would make   1 This can never be optimal since individuals (by
assumption) have no interest in consumption per se; consumption only matters insofar as it increases 
Indeed, when   1 utility can be increased by lowering  (and thus ) without aﬀecting . On the
other hand, when   (1 + ) the eﬀort level is constant; i.e., ∗ = ∗ = 11+ 
2.2.2 Production
There is a unique consumption good, , which is produced using labor input, , as well as a fixed supply
of land, . Technology (or aggregate eﬃciency), , is also parametrically fixed. Potential income is
 =  1− ⇒  =  ()−1  (5)
where  ≡ 
Actual income of individuals depends on eﬀort. Eﬀort is thought to scale income up or down but is
not subject to diminishing returns. This assumption ensures that dynasties who exert more eﬀort will hold
a permanent earnings advantage; if eﬀort is subject to diminishing returns high-eﬀort dynasties would not
persistently be able to sustain larger family sizes than low-eﬀort dynasties. The absence of diminishing
returns to eﬀort may be reasonable if “eﬀort” is given a broad interpretation. That is, if eﬀort is thought
to capture the intensity at which individuals dedicate themselves mentally as well as physically to income
enhancing activities, rather than being narrowly defined as the supply of working hours. Assuming labor
absorbs all rents, the income of an individual therefore is
 =  ()−1  (6)
2.2.3 The Evolution of the Economy
We now characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy. Initially we consider a setting with cultural
homogeneity. Having characterized this we then introduce a cultural change, taking the form of a parametric
change in preferences, and investigate how this cultural change plays out in the economy.
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Cultural Homogeneity When all individuals share the same work ethic, , the size of the population
evolves according to
+1 =  0 given. (7)
We therefore have the following lemma:
Lemma 1
(i) The time path for population is given by the law of motion
+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 if  ≤ 
1
1+
1
 1− if   

≡  ()  0 given,
and  ≡
³
(1+)

´ 1−1 
(ii) For constant values of   and  the model admits a unique steady state population size, ∗,
given by
∗ =
µ 
1 + 
1

¶ 1
1− 
(iii) Steady state income per capita is
∗ = 
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1
(i) The level of income per capita is independent of technology and preferences. (ii) A higher level
of technological sophistication and greater preference for work eﬀort increases long-run population size:
∗  0, ∗  0
Proof. See Appendix.
The dynamic system works as follows. If initially the population is suﬃciently small (i.e., if   ¯) the
level of income per capita in the economy is high enough to ensure that all children survive.12 Hence  = 1,
for which reason the population grows at the exogenous rate . As   1, a steady state does not exist in
12Again, this follows since we have (to conserve on notation) defined the maximum survival to be 1.
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the range 0    ¯. Eventually, however, income drops below the threshold needed for an entire cohort
to survive to adulthood, due to diminishing returns to labor input. Gradually, therefore, population growth
grinds to a halt and the economy ends up in the steady state ∗. In the steady state the level of income per
capita is ; independent of technology and preferences.
The intuition for the comparative statics is straightforward. Individuals with a greater work ethic will
obtain a higher level of income, which in turn translates into more surviving oﬀspring. Similarly, if  rises,
income per capita increases, and this again leads to more surviving oﬀspring. However, in both cases a
larger population is associated with diminishing returns, which serves to equilibrate the system. In the
long-run, therefore, greater work eﬀort or technological advances will not elevate income per capita but are
fully converted into a larger population. Aside from the impact of cultural values on long-run population
density, these predictions coincide with those of the canonical Malthusian macro model (Ashraf and Galor
2009).
Cultural Heterogeneity Suppose now that a (small) subgroup of the population experience a parametric
preference change; disutility from work eﬀort declines. Subsequently there are two groups in society: group
one and two, with 2  1. These new preferences are preserved within the dynasty, and thus transmitted
from parent to oﬀspring. By assuming a unique shock to preferences we are able to examine the pure
selection channel by which the new preferences become more pervasive in the population. That is, by way
of higher reproductive success, high eﬀort dynasties grow as a share of the population. Naturally, a process
of cultural change occurs more rapidly if low eﬀort dynasties gradually choose to mimic the successful high
eﬀort dynasties. But in the present case we assume that there is a unique shock to preferences.
Hence, in the absence of further shocks we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2
(i) With cultural heterogeneity the law of motion for population size is given by
+1 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (1 + 2) if   1
2 + 11+1 111− if 1 ≤   2(
1−2
(1+1)(1+2)
∙
1 +
³
1+2
1+1
´ 10
20
¸−1
+ 11+1
)
1
 1− if 2 ≤ 

≡  ( )  10 20 given,
where total population  =P  ,  ≡ ³ (1+) ´ 1−1   = 1 2
(ii) For constant values of    and , the model admits a unique steady state population size, ∗,
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given by
∗ =
µ 
1 + 2
1

¶ 1
1− 
where ∗  2
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 2
If initially the population holds a work ethic consistent with 1 and then subsequently an arbitrarily small
subgroup of the population changes cultural values to 2  1 then long-run aggregate population size rises.
Proof. See Appendix
With two groups there are two thresholds to be distinguished, as  is a co-determinant of the level of
population at which  = 1 As group two exerts more eﬀort (2  1) it is able to ensure survival of an
entire birth cohort at a lower level of potential income, , than group one. This creates the intermediate
regime, ¯1    ¯2, where all oﬀspring of high work ethic parents survive until period two, whereas a
fraction of the children of the low work ethic group dies during childhood. Eventually, however, income falls
to a suﬃciently low level to produce   1 for both groups. The process ultimately stabilizes and allows for
a unique steady state as described in Lemma 2.
The dynamic process works as follows. Initially a small group of citizens change cultural values. Since
the new group works harder, their income is greater. This works to increase population density. However,
if the high work ethic group initially is small then the immediate impact on aggregate population size will
be miniscule. But since the high work ethic group can aﬀord higher levels of child consumption, it holds a
reproductive advantage in the Malthusian setting. This advantage implies that the group’s population share
gradually rises over time, thereby increasingly stimulating aggregate population size. Hence, after the initial
shock to the economy, the growth process is driven by the changing composition of the population in terms
of cultural values; a process of growth through cultural change is occurring.
Eventually the group with high work ethic will dominate the population, and the economy convergences
to a steady state where population size reflects the preferences of the high work ethic group. It follows from
Proposition 2 that the steady state level of population is higher in the new steady state compared to the
original one, as 2  1
The model thus shows how a change in a certain cultural attitude in a small subset of the population
may rise in importance due to selective pressures and eventually influence the macroeconomy. The source
of the change of preferences is left unexplained by the model. But it seems plausible that the Cistercians
15
have influenced county populations in this manner, as argued in Section 2.1. Accordingly, our hypothesis is
that Cistercians planted the seeds of change by aﬀecting the cultural attitudes; or, more appropriately, the
work ethic of a (in principle arbitrarily) small part of the county population. By so doing, they instigated a
process of growth through cultural change.
2.2.4 Speed of Diﬀusion
A question of some relevance is how fast the cultural diﬀusion process played out if it only emanates from
diﬀerential population growth rates across dynasties with diﬀerent values. Naturally, the process would
conceivably occur at a faster rate than what we find below if values gradually diﬀuse across dynasties as
well, following the initial shock to a select group of dynasties. In practise one may well imagine that both
mechanisms were at work.
In order to examine the speed of population-growth driven cultural change, note that the fraction of
individuals with high work ethic at time  is
2
 ≡  =
1
1 +
³
1+2
1+1
´ 10
20
 (8)
when   ¯2. Hence we focus on the (more realistic) case where not all children survive to adulthood from
either group. The speed at which 2 becomes dominant in society depends on how much more eﬀort the
high work ethic group exerts, 1+21+1 =
12  as well as how many individuals were “persuaded” to change their
values as of time  = 0. The ratio of ’s is hard to pin down in any precise manner. But suppose group two
exerts 20% higher eﬀort than group one.13 In this case Figure 4 shows how the new cultural values grow
in significance over time for diﬀerent assumptions about the initial “infection rate”; that is, 0 = 01%, 1%
and 10% of the population, respectively.
The spread of the new cultural values follows an S-shaped trajectory: the process is slow to begin with but
accelerates over time and ultimately levels oﬀ. Consider the curve in the middle, associated with an initial
“infection rate” of 1%. The first 10 generations only raise the fraction with strong work ethic modestly (to
about 6%), the next 10 generations increase the share to 30% of the population, and another five to nearly
50%. If a generation is about 20 years, 25 generations (what it takes to go from 1% to 50%) is about 500
years. The point is that, within the window of observation available to us (about 500 years), it is possible
for a small (initial) cultural shock from the Cistercians to accumulate into a major aggregate impact on the
13Clark and Van der Werf (1998) estimate that the number of days worked per year (standard deviation in parenthesis) rose
in England from 266 (4.8) in 1560-99 to 280 (12.9) in 1771. Suppose this increase is attributable to the rise of the Protestant
work ethic, resulting from the Cistercian presence and the Reformation. Then the estimated increase over time in work days
provides a crude guesstimate for . Factoring in the statistical uncertainty we may note that working days in 1771 may have
been between 5% lower and 23% higher than in 1560, with a mean around +10%. Hence, assuming a 20% higher work eﬀort
may not be outlandish; especially so since our notion of work eﬀort is somewhat broader than the mere number of days worked.
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Figure 4: The rise of new cultural values in the population. Assumptions: (a) 20% higher work eﬀort among
individuals with “high” work eﬀort”. (b) Initial “infection” rate: 1/1000 (solid black), 1/100 (dashed), 1/10
(dotted).
composition of the population solely by way of selective pressure.
Another point worth emphasizing is the implied comparative diﬀerences in cultural beliefs that seemingly
small initial diﬀerences translates into. With an initial infection rate, 0, of one percent, 50 percent of the
population holds a high work ethic after 25 generations; but only eight percent have high work ethic after
25 generations if the initial infection rate is 1/10th of a percentage point. This implies that variations in the
intensity of Cistercian presence may have generated substantial comparative diﬀerences in cultural values
across English counties over the period in question, by aﬀecting 0. It may therefore be possible to detect
the legacy of the Cistercians on population dynamics over the period 1377-1801, which we examine below.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section proceeds in a series of steps. We begin by deriving an empirical model based on the theoretical
model from the previous section. Subsequently, in Section 3.2, we discuss the relevance and interpretation of
the resulting empirical model. Section 3.3 presents the data, while Section 3.4 contains our OLS regression
results. Finally, Section 3.5 discusses potential pitfalls in ways of identification and reports our IV results.
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3.1 From the Theoretical Model to an Empirical Model
The theoretical analysis established that, upon a small cultural shock to the population, areas with a larger
fraction of their citizens having a higher work ethic should see faster population growth. To make this pre-
diction amendable to empirical testing, we use Lemma 2 to write the law of motion for aggregate population
as
log (+1)− log () = − log ()− (1− ) log () + log () + log () 
where
 =
∙ 1 − 2
(1 + 1) (1 + 2) +
1
1 + 1
¸

while  ≡ 2 captures the fraction of the population with high work ethic.14 If we linearize log ()
around  = 0 we obtain log () ≈ − log (1 + 1)+ 1−21+2 , which can be reinserted into the law of motion
for population growth so as to obtain (approximately)
log (+1)− log () = − log (1 + 1)− log () + 1 − 2
1 + 2  − (1− ) log () + log () 
Finally, denoting a county by  and adding an error term, we may write the above as the empirical model:
∆ log (+1) = 0 + 1 log () + 2 + Z0a+ 
where Z contains time-invariant controls for productivity ().
Naturally, we do not have data on . But, according to the theory, we may proxy it using some measure
of the intensity of Cistercian presence in the county, as it should influence 0 and thereby  (see equation
(8)). We define this intensity as the Cistercian presence relative to other moral influences. Since the Church
was the principal authority in matters of moral in medieval times, we construct  as the ratio of Cistercian
monasteries to all religious houses; i.e.  = . However, the counterfactual we are interested in is that
of changing the composition of moral influences while at the same time holding constant its level. This
dictates that we also control for the total number of religious houses, , separately. Consequently, we take
the following specification to the data:
∆ log (+1) = 0 + 1 log () + 2 + 3 + Z
0a+  (9)
Ceteris paribus, areas with more Cistercians saw a larger fraction of the population initially being “per-
suaded” by the Cistercian work ethic. As seen from Figure 4 this should imply a higher  at any given
14More specifically, we use equation (10) in the proof of the lemma; see Appendix A.3.
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point in time. As a result, we expect 2 to come out with a positive sign. In addition, theory predicts that
1  0, capturing convergence eﬀects. The coeﬃcient 3 is a priori indeterminate.
3.2 Relevance and Interpretation of the Empirical Model
In the context of empirical relevance there are two issues worth considering. First, is the Malthusian per-
spective relevant for the period in question? Second, equation (9) is derived under a “closed economy”
assumption. That is, the model does not allow for migration flows. Is this a reasonable approximation for
the period in question?
Ultimately it is an empirical issue whether the Malthusian population theory has any bearing on de-
velopments in England from 1377-1801. However, a priori we believe a reasonable case can be made that
Malthusian considerations were relevant. Clark (2007) builds a strong case that Malthusian dynamics were
relevant until about 1800 in England. In a similar vein, Møller and Sharp (2008), employing time series data
for England over the period 1560-1760, confirm the relevance of Malthusian population dynamics. Using
cross-country data Ashraf and Galor (2009) also confirm the central predictions of the Malthusian model in
pre-industrial times.
We also view the closed economy assumption as a reasonable (albeit crude) approximation to reality
for the period in question. Although serfdom began to decline with the Black Death, and was practically
obsolete in England by the sixteenth century, even as late as the early eighteenth century internal migration
was characterized by limited geographical movement (Clark 1979). A contributing factor to the low degree of
mobility was the Old Poor Law, which meant to supply relief to the temporarily unemployed, and which was
administrated at the Parish level. In particular, the Settlement Act of 1662 imposed that only “established
residents” of a Parish could receive relief. In practise this meant that only individuals who were able to
prove an aﬃliation with the Parish through birth, marriage or apprenticeship were eligible for aid. Needless
to say, this policy worked to lower mobility. The Poor Law Amendment Act overhauled the existing system.
In particular, it established “Poor Law Unions” around groups of Parishes, which then administrated the
poor relief. But this amendment did not take eﬀect until 1834.
This is not to say that individuals did not move at all during the period in question. They did, and
increasingly so over time. London, in particular, enjoyed a special status and always experienced substantial
immigration. But it was the industrial revolution which saw the major break with the past and large scale
migration in particular to the new industrial centres in the Northwest and the Midlands (Nicholas and
Shergold 1987). As a result, suppressing internal migration seems like a reasonable approximation for most
of the period in question.
Nevertheless, one may speculate what the implications would be if the assumption is not met. Suppose
that counties characterized by individuals with high work ethic are (for this reason) more innovative. That
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is, suppose  is aﬀected by culture (more on this below). If so, one would expect people to migrate to the
high work ethic counties, which would stimulate growth in population density in areas where individuals have
high work ethic. In terms of population dynamics this outcome is therefore observably equivalent to the no-
migration scenario that we examined theoretically. The only way to distinguish the migration scenario from
the no-migration scenario would be to study the impact of Cistercian presence on income per capita. With
migration innovations would induce rising income per capita, wheras this is not the case when no migration
is taking place (see Ashraf and Galor, 2009). Unfortunately, county level data on income per capita is
not available for England during this period. Hence we are unable to distinguish whether the Cistercians,
through instigation of cultural change, induced higher population growth either by increasing the number of
surviving oﬀspring at the county level (as suggested by our model), by stimulating inward migration, or by
some combination of the two. However, regardless of the precise source of rising population density, a positive
impact from Cistercians on population growth implies, in a Malthusian setting, a productivity enhancing
eﬀect from the Order. Hence, the empirical test of the impact from the Cistercians (using equation (9)) is
meaningful whatever the “truth” may be about internal migration in England prior to 1801. But there are
other reasons why the interpretation of 2 might diﬀer from what is implied by the theoretical model.
While equation (9) has a structural foundation in our model, we doubt very much that our estimations of
2 will map into the structural parameters 1 and 2, for two reasons. First, the Cistercians almost certainly
also influenced attitudes towards saving and investment; i.e., thrift. Hence, dynasties that were influenced
by the Cistercian mindset also had an earnings advantage through this channel. A more fully articulated
theoretical model (but also a much more complex one) would allow both cultural traits to emerge in the
wake of Cistercian influence, and grow in pervasiveness over time. We conjecture that such a model would
predict that the relationship between  and population growth reflects preferences for work eﬀort as well as
the willingness to postpone consumption. Second, it is probable that the changing cultural values influenced
productivity, . As explained in Section 2.1, the Cistercian order were at the forefront of technological
change prior to the Reformation. Insofar as their cultural attitudes spread throughout local populations,
it is conceivable that this also encouraged local technology adoption. If so, the level of  may have been
influenced by the frequency of individuals valuing hard work and thrift.15 While our regressions below do
involve several controls for , our estimates for 2 may nevertheless also be capturing the indirect influence
of cultural values on population growth through productivity.
In sum, one should be cognizant of the fact that the cultural values emphasized by the proposed theory
represents “ultimate determinants” of prosperity, which served to stimulate key proximate sources of growth:
labor eﬀort, capital accumulation and technological change. Realistically, the estimate for 2 is therefore
15Endogenous technological change is not inconsistent with Malthusian population dynamics; see Aiyar, Dalgaard and Moav
(2008).
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best viewed as the reduced form impact of cultural values on growth mediated by these individual channels.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Cistercian presence ()
Researchers at the University College London (UCL) have constructed a database of 776 religious houses
in England from the 10th to the 16th century. The database includes the name of the particular religious
houses, the order of the monks, nuns etc., year of foundation and dissolution, and the county in which the
monastery was located.16 We gathered these data into one dataset, which we then used to calculate the
number of religious houses in each county (relhouses) and the number of Cistercian monasteries as a share of
total religious houses in each county (cistercianshare). In order to gauge robustness, we also construct the
share of other major religious orders. We made one correction to the data with respect to the city of York,
which was listed by UCL as a county. York was a walled city situated in North Yorkshire. To be able to
match the data with the data on population density, we re-coded it as part of the county North Yorkshire.
Table 1 lists the frequency distribution of the various religious houses in the UCL database, while Figure 5
maps the spatial distribution of the cistercianshare. In the analysis below we focus on the main religious
orders: Benedictian monks, Augustinian canons, Cistercian monks, as well as the Premons and Cluniacs.
[Table 1 about here]
3.3.2 Population and population density ( and )
We obtained data on population density for the year 1377 from Campbell (2008) (popdens1377 ). Campbell
also provides the area of the counties; we transformed them from square miles into square kilometers. The
distribution of the population in 1377 is based on 1.38 million adult males and females who contributed to the
poll tax of 1377.17 The level of the population is based on an estimate by Campbell (2000) of 4 million.18
Campbell only reports population numbers for the aggregate of London and Middlesex, not for the two
counties separately. In order to match the data, all data on all variables is aggregated in this way. Yet we
end up excluding London and Middlesex in all regressions, since it is an outlier. We note for completeness,
however, that including London and Middlesex makes no diﬀerence to our results.
Wrigley (2007) provides population estimates for 1761, 1771, 1781, 1791, and 1801. These are based
on registered marriages, which were more completely recorded than baptisms and burials on which previ-
16The data are available online at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/history2/englishmonasticarchives/religioushouses/index.php.
17These numbers are available in Dobson (1983).
18Campbell (2008) also reports population data for 1300. But since about 10% of Cistercian settlement occur around that
year, or after, the risk of reverse causality tainting our estimations would be enhanced if we used 1300 as our initial year. As a
result we stick with 1377 as the initial date. However, we will use the 1300 numbers in the context of our IV regressions below.
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 Figure 5: Cistercian monasteries as a share of all religious houses across England, 1098-1540
ous population estimates were based (Rickman 1802). While our preferred variable is population in 1801
(popdens1801 ), the choice of end-year is inconsequential to our results.
3.3.3 Time invariant productivity controls ()
Agricultural Land Classification Natural England provides a measure of agricultural land classified
into five grades plus classifications for non-agricultural and urban land. Grade one is best quality and grade
five is poorest quality, grade six is non-agricultural land and grade seven is urban. The measure is calculated
by Natural England using information on climate (temperature, rainfall, aspect, exposure, frost risk), site
(gradient, micro-relief, flood risk) and soil (depth, structure, texture, chemicals, stoniness). The source of
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the data is Raster Digital mapping with a scale of 1:250,000.19 The data was gathered with coordinate
precision of 1 meter. We used these data to create a measure of agricultural land quality within each county.
The earliest digital map of English counties is from 1851. These data were kindly provided to us by
University of Portsmouth and the Great Britain Historical GIS Project. Combining the shapefile including
the agricultural land quality and the shapefile including English county borders, we were able to create
measures of the area in a county with agricultural land of quality level 1-5, each as a share of total county
area.20 Our preferred variable is the combination of qualities 1 and 2, which we shall denote agrquality1_2.21
Waterways As noted in Section 2.1, the Cistercian were strong exponents of water powered production
and they employed advanced irrigation techniques, which could be responsible for their influence on English
population growth. To control for this kind of influence from Cistercian presence we therefore add controls
for waterways.
The German company Geofabrik freely provides shapefiles on various geographic features.22 Of our
interest is their data on waterways in Great Britain, where waterways are divided into canal, dock, drain,
moat, river, and stream.23 As with the data on agricultural land quality, we merge the shapefile describing
waterways with the shapefile describing the county borders of England. The outcomes of interest from this
procedure is the total length of rivers as a share of the total area in a county (rivershare) and the total
length of streams as a share of county area (streamshare). The variable (riverstreamshare) measures the
total length of rivers and streams as a share of the county area.
Regional fixed eﬀects In an eﬀort to control more rigorously for structural characteristics with bearing
on population growth we add a full set of regional dummy variables. The regional classification is based
on Government Oﬃce regions: East Midlands, East of England, London, North East, North West, South
East, South West, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and the Humber. Observe that in a sample consisting
of 40 counties it is a rather strong check of the relevance of Cistercian presence to allow for nine regional
identifiers.
Table 2 provides summary statistics and a correlation matrix on the variables discussed above.
19Available online at: http://www.gis.naturalengland.org.uk/pubs/gis/gis_register.asp. Data descrip-
tion available online at: http://www.magic.gov.uk/datadoc/metadata.asp?dataset=2&x=16&y=10 and
http://naturalengland.etraderstores.com/NaturalEnglandShop/product.aspx?ProductID=88ﬀ926a-3177-4090-aecb-
00e6c9030b29.
20The total county area was here calculated by summing over the land quality variable, since this variable spans the entire
area.
21None of the results change if we instead include agrquality1 and agrquality2 together or separately. If we include a variable
measuring the aggregate agricultural quality over grades 1, 2, and 3, results are unchanged, except column 9 of Table 4 below,
where the t -value on cistercianshare drops to 1.16.
22These shapefiles are based on maps created by the OpenStreetMap project using data from portable GPS devices, aerial
photography, other free sources, or simply from local knowledge.
23Available online at: http://download.geofabrik.de/osm/europe/great_britain/
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[Tables 2a and b about here]
3.4 Results
Table 3 reports our baseline results. In all columns of the table we control for initial population density, the
total number of religious houses, the share of all religious houses which are Cistercian, and the productivity
control agricultural land quality. The regression in column 1 shows that these variables collectively hold
significant explanatory power with respect to population growth over the period 1377-1801; the regression
explains roughly two thirds of the variation in the dependent variable.
The following eight columns add the additional controls discussed above, one by one. Finally, column
10 includes all the controls simultaneously. Several features of the results are noteworthy. First, the share
of Cistercians is statistically significant in all columns. This means that the composition of religious houses
matters, with more Cistercians being associated with higher population growth rates. In addition, Cistercian
point estimates are fairly stable, always situated in the interval [167 207].
Second, while initial population density displays the expected conditional convergence feature, it is sur-
prising that agricultural land quality has a negative impact on population growth. However, the explanation
for this is partly found in the high positive correlation between initial population density and agricultural
land quality (corr. coef. = 043), cf. Table 2b. This means that initial population density picks up some of
the eﬀect of land quality on population growth.
Third, land area adds significant explanatory power. Yet the fact that the physical infrastructure of rivers
and/or streams did not seem to matter for population growth suggests that neither irrigation nor aqua-based
transportation were significant binding constraints to growth.
Fourth, in columns 6-9, where we add the share of the other dominant religious orders, only the Cluniac
order adds significant explanatory power. This is in itself an interesting finding since the Cluniacs can
be viewed as carriers of the same sort of cultural values embedded in the Order of the Cistercians. The
Cluniacs were an earlier attempt (from the tenth century) to return to a more strict observance of the Rule
of St. Benedict, although within the Benedictine order of monks (Southern 1970). The significance of the
Cluniacs is all the more interesting in light of the fact that Weber highlighted this particular Order alongside
the Cistercians as precursors of “Protestant values” (cf. Section 2.1). Accordingly, their influence on pre-
industrial development in England represents further support for a pre-Reformation origin of the “Protestant
ethic”.
Finally, in column 10, where we include all control variables simultaneously, the Cistercian share remains
significant and situated in the aforementioned interval. The association between Cistercian presence and
population growth is therefore quite robust.
[Table 3 about here]
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In Table 4 we add regional fixed eﬀects to all columns of Table 3. To the extent that we have omitted
certain time-invariant regional productivity factors, regional fixed eﬀects will alleviate this problem provided
the regional classification captures these omitted confounders. One case in point could be proximity to coal
production, which Allen (2009) and Pomeranz (2000) argue was critical for British industrialization because
it supplied an inexhaustible supply of cheap energy. Since the location of coal mines is a fixed eﬀect, regional
dummies will pick up this eﬀect.
The first thing to notice in Table 4 is that the share of Cistercian houses remains significant in all
columns save for columns 7 and 10. However, in both columns the regional dummies are jointly insignificant,
for which reason these columns add nothing to columns 7 and 10 of Table 3. Consequently, disagreement
between Tables 3 and 4 only arise in column 5 with respect to initial population density.
Another way to appreciate the findings reported in Table 4, as compared to those reported in Table 3, is
by observing that the point estimate for Cistercians is virtually unaﬀected by adding regional fixed eﬀects.
The occasional change in statistical significance is thus solely due to a reduced precision in estimation, which
may well be due to multicollinearity; multicollinearity almost inevitably becomes an issue when we introduce
nine regional identifiers, on top of the other controls, in a  = 40 sample.
Overall, the results from Table 3 continue to hold up fairly well when regional dummies are added. In
particular, only the Cistercians and the Cluniacs seem to exert a significant impact on population growth
during the period; it is, however, only the Cistercian impact that survives inclusion of all controls. Finally,
it appears that the simple baseline model associated with column 1 of Table 3 is suﬃcient for purposes of
accounting for the association between Cistercian presence and comparative English population growth.
[Table 4 about here]
Figure 6 provides a visual depiction of the relationship between the share of Cistercians and the growth
rate in population as estimated by column 1, Table 3. Inspection of the figure shows that Westmorland and
Lancashire may exert some leverage on the estimated coeﬃcient. Yet, neither of these two counties is driving
the result: exclusion of either one changes nothing. In addition, the share of Cistercians stays significant
(slope est. = 1.47 and std. err. = 0.76) when we perform robust regression analysis (more detailed results
are available upon request).24
What is the economic eﬀect of changing the composition of religious houses in the direction of one
more Cistercian abbey, holding the total number of religious houses constant? To answer this question we
diﬀerentiate (9) with respect to  to get 2 Evaluated at the mean of , we get that the said change will
increase the proportional diﬀerence in population by approximately 01 log point. This change would have
lifted the population of Cambridgeshire in 1801, the median county in terms of population in 1377, from an
24This is the rreg option in Stata 10.
25
W estm orland
Durham
Northum berland
Cornwall
Derb yshireHertfordshireBerkshireCambridgesh ireNorfolk
Rutland
Sussex
Suf folk
Here fordshire
Som erset
W iltshireBucking hamshire
Sh opshire
Worcestershire
Northam ptonshireLincolnshire
Yorkshire, North Riding
Yorkshire, East Riding
Kent
Nottingham shire
Surrey
Leicestershire
Ham psh ire
Essex
Dorset
W arw ickshire
Yorkshire, W est Riding
Hunt ingdon shire
Gloucestershire
Devon
Lancashire
Oxfordshire
Bedfordshire
Cumb erland
Staf fordshireCheshire
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
e(
 d
lo
gp
op
13
77
_1
80
1 
| X
 )
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
e( cistercianshare | X )
coef =  1.9340059, (rob ust) se = .887130 08, t = 2.18
Figure 6: The impact of Cistercians presence on population growth.
actual size 93,440 to a counterfactual size of about 103,000.
3.5 Threats to Identification
3.5.1 Location of Cistercian Monasteries
An objection to the preceding results is that they could be spurious. That is, perhaps the Cistercians simply
chose to locate in areas with a pronounced productive potential. Based on the historical evidence, however,
this possibility does not seem likely. The Order had a stated preference for situating their monasteries
in remote, even devastated, locations (Cooke 1893; Donkin 1963). Indeed, it has long been accepted by
scholars that the Cistercians acted as transformers of wastelands into fertile farms, as mirrored in the poet
Wordsworth’s Cistercian Monastery.25
This conventional wisdom receives quantitative support in Table 2b, from which it is clear that Cistercian
presence was lower in areas featuring high population density in 1377. Also supportive of the traditional
view of the spatial distribution of monasteries is the negative correlation between the intensity of Cistercian
presence and soil quality. Since we control for both initial population density and soil quality in our regres-
sions, these regularities are unlikely to bias the parameter of interest. To this one may add that since the
monasteries were largely in place from the beginning of our period of observation, as observed in Section
2.1, it is impossible that their location is endogenous to population growth during the ensuring centuries on
25 “Where’er they rise, the sylvan waste retires, And aery harvests crown the fertile lea.”
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account of reverse causality.
Of course, one may worry that by chance Cistercian monasteries just happened to be located in areas
that ultimately proved to be high growth regions. For instance, looking at Figure 5 it is clear that there is
a cluster of Cistercian monasteries in the North West of England; areas that long after the Dissolution of
Monasteries turned out to be rich on coal (Allen 2009). Yet coal played a relatively modest role vis-à-vis
the growth process prior to industrialization, which is the time period we examine above. More generally,
our regression analysis introduces nine regional dummies, which should ensure that omitted time-invariant
confounders do not bias results. In spite of these consideration doubt may linger. As a consequence we
provide a final check by invoking instrumental variables estimation.
The Cistercians had a particular preference for locating in secluded and sparsely populated areas, as
explained above. At the time of arrival the most secluded areas may well have been the forests owned by
the Crown. As Donkin (1963, p. 184) observes: “..there is a really significant connection with the Royal
Forests; one-third of all the English [Cistercian] houses lay at first within or very near their bounds [...]. In
these areas there was a good deal of land of low value for endowments; nonroyal landowners were gravely
hampered by the forest laws; and, as elsewhere, prospective founders undoubtedly responded to the willingness
of the early generations of monks to exploit rough, undeveloped country.” Thus, there may well have been a
double coincidence of wants. Nonroyal landowners, wanting to save their souls from eternal damnation, had
an interest in allowing Cistercians to settle at or near Royal Forests, which were of limited value beyond the
occasional hunt with the Monarch. At the same time, this location satisfied the ascetic needs of the Cistercian
settlers.26 Hence the presence of a Royal Forest in a county could be a potentially viable instrument for
Cistercian settlements. But is the presence of Royal Forest a plausibly excludable instrument for Cistercian
presence?
The concept of Royal Forest was introduced in England by the Normans in the 11th century. They were
protected areas of land (not necessarily woodland) where the king had privileged hunting rights under the
“forest law”, which oﬀered strict penalties to anyone using these areas for hunting or farming. The system
was at its height in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, but already in 1215 Magna Carta laid down
limits to the power of the monarchy in the forests, and the “Great Perambulation” of 1300 vastly reduced
the scale of the forests. Generally the system decayed after this time, and Henry VIII placed the forests
under the Court of Augmentations in 1547, the body which was set up to administer the land and finances
of the Roman Catholic Church after the Dissolution of the Monasteries. Although the designation “Royal
Forest” still exists in contemporary England, Royal Forests were considered anachronistic after the Tudor
period and the enforcement of any rights had completely died out by the mid-17th century (Grant 1991).
26Finally, the monarch may also have had an incentive to encourage the practise. Madden (1963) notes that the king likely
granted rights of pasture over wide tracts of the royal lands and forests because the Cistercians were willing to pay for this
service using revenue from sale of wool; wool which derived from sheep using the royal lands for grazing.
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Towards the end Royal Forests were mainly associated with giving privileged access to timber, but even these
rules were poorly enforced. Most of the protection for wooded areas within the Royal Forests was broken
with the massive disaﬀorestments of 1327 and the generally less eﬀective means of enforcement (Young 1978,
pp. 102-103). Accordingly, since the Royal Forest as an institution was of little importance after the 14th
century, it seems plausible that while the settlement pattern of the Cistercians is partially explained by
the location of Royal Forests, the location of Royal Forests as such cannot explain cross-county population
growth into the nineteenth century.
We obtained data on the location of Royal Forests in the 13th Century from Bazeley (1921). Based on
the maps constructed by Bazeley, we constructed a dummy variable, “Rforest”, which is equal to one if a
royal forest were to be found in the county in the 13th century.27 Accordingly, we expect to find a positive
partial eﬀect of Royal Forest on the intensity of Cistercian settlements.
In order to better explain Cistercian settlements across areas where a Royal Forest was found in the 13th
century, we also employ (log) population density in 1300; a point in time where not all monasteries had been
founded (see Figure 1). The theory is that Cistercians would prefer to settle near Royal Forests, and even
more so if the county in question was sparsely populated. As a result, we expect to find a negative eﬀect
from population density in 1300 in the first stage.
We also expect that population density in 1300 is excludable in our regressions. It should be of little
relevance to growth in population density between 1377 and 1801 (i.e., above and beyond its influence via
Cistercian settlements) since we control for initial population density in 1377 in the regressions below.
In sum, we believe the presence of Royal Forest and county level population density in 1300 both plausibly
fulfill the exclusion restriction. Of course, with two instruments and one endogenous variable this prior can
be subjected to formal tests, thus oﬀering an opportunity to reject the identifying assumption.
Table 5 reports a summary of our results. In column 1 we estimate a stripped down model were the only
independent variables are the intensity of Cistercian presence and initial population density in 1377. The
two instruments have the expected sign in the first stage, and the Cistercian influence is estimated with high
precision in the second stage. The obtained result is consistent with our OLS findings: more Cistercians
seems to foster faster population growth from 1377 to 1801. Moreover, data does not allow us to reject the
exclusion restriction.28
In the remaining columns we add more controls. In particular, in column 3 we add all the controls
featured in Table 3 simultaneously; i.e., we estimate the equivalent of column 10 in Table 3. The impact of
Cistercians remains significant and positive but the size of the point estimate shrinks. This is no surprise. As
explained in Section 2, one may view Cistercian cultural values as an ultimate determinant of productivity,
27We also experimented with using forest area in the 13th century, but this instrument turned out to be weak.
28 In column 1 the instruments are not statistically strong. But the Anderson-Rubin test (not shown), which is robust to
weak identification, reveal that the Cistercian share is significant thus suggesting a causal impact.
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which influences population growth through several more proximate pathways (e.g., technology, labor eﬀort,
and perhaps savings). The more controls we add, the more of these proximate determinants of population
density are likely controlled for, which should cause the impact from Cistercian presence to decline. Of
course, absent direct measurement of cultural values (or of all the proximate sources of growth), it should
not be possible to eliminate the impact from the Order entirely, which is what we find. In columns 2 and 3
our instruments of choice are statisically strong and the exclusion restriction is not rejected by the data.
As a quick comparison between column 3 in Table 5 and column 10 in Table 3 makes clear the estimate
rises somewhat when the intensity of Cistercian presence is instrumented. This is consistent with the under-
lying theory that Cistercian presence is capturing cultural values; if so, then Cistercian presence is a proxy
variable for the fraction of the population carrying Protestant values, which therefore should be associated
with an attenuation bias in the OLS setting.
[Table 5 about here]
Taken together, we believe that these results strengthen the case for a causal link between Cistercian
presence and population growth 1377-1801. A greater Cistercian presence worked to promote population
growth, consistent with the proposed theory of growth through cultural change. Still a causal impact could
also arise for non-cultural reasons, as discussed next.
3.5.2 International Trade
There is an influential strand of literature which asserts that international interaction profoundly influences
economic growth. For instance, the work of Frankel and Romer (1999), Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) and
Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) suggests that geographic features that facilitate international international
interaction (e.g., access to sea, small country size, etc.) hold a significant impact on actual international
interaction (either via travel or trade) and ultimately on contemporary prosperity. But why might interaction,
in ways of trade for instance, have stimulated growth in the very long run?
One possibility is that the intensity of international trade has influenced the type of policies and insti-
tutions that were implemented, and thereby long-run economic outcomes. More concretely, Acemoglu et al.
(2005) argue that the Atlantic trade was a key driving force behind the rise of Western Europe after 1500.
The argument is that the Atlantic trade enriched and strengthened commercial interests outside the royal
circle in countries with non-absolutist initial institutions (such as England); this in turn shifted the balance
of power away from the Crown, ultimately instigating significant pro-growth institutional reform.29
Naturally, this literature focuses on the development of nation states, whereas we are examining regional
29Another potential benefit from trade is that it enables knowledge spillovers between countries. We return to the issue of
whether technology can account for our results in the next section.
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development. Nevertheless, inspired by the theory of Acemoglu et al., a hypothesis that suggests itself is
that counties particularly involved in international trade adopted local policies and local institutions more
beneficial to growth than what was the case elsewhere.
Could such considerations impinge on the apparent link between Cistercians and population growth? It is
certainly well known that the Cistercians were active in international trade; they were particularly involved
in the trade of wool and cloth. Hence the Cistercians may have contributed to the establishment of early
trade centers, which would then (partly) account for a persistent eﬀect on later population growth. That is,
long after the Cistercian presence ended, trade continued at high intensity in the places the Order supported
early on. Observe that this theory would still support a causal impact from Cistercians on long-run growth,
consistent with our 2SLS estimates above. However, according to this line of reasoning, cultural change is
unimportant. In sum, the non-cultural trade story behind our findings would be
Cistercians ⇒ Trade ⇒ Trade+ ⇒ Population density+ 
where the last arrow could be motivated via policy or institutional changes, following the logic of the
Acemoglu et al. (2005) argument. We unfortunately lack data on early international trade flows at the
county level. But what we can do instead is to examine whether the influence from Cistercians is reduced
once we control for key geographical features that should support international trade; if actual historical
trade, much like contemporary international trade, depend on geography then this is a viable proxy variable
approach.
Specifically, we add a coastal dummy to our baseline regressions in Table 3. To be sure, if the Cistercians
indeed instigated the rise of trade centers, one would expect this eﬀect to be strong precisely along the
coast, which is where goods arrive and are shipped oﬀ (recall that our regressions already control for inland
waterways).
Table 6 presents the results from introducing the coastal dummy. Columns 1-9 reproduce Table 3 while
adding on top the coastal dummy. In Column 10 we add all the controls simultaneously (11 in total). The
basic message from the table is that the inclusion of the coastal dummy does not aﬀect the partial correlation
between the intensity of Cistercian presence and population growth. Hence, although there are some hints at
a correlation between Cistercian presence and coastal areas (see Figure 5), and although their strong trading
traditions may have left a lasting mark on economic growth, it does not seem that this can account for the
reduced form link between the Order and long-run population growth.
[Table 6 about here]
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3.5.3 Technology and Human Capital
As discussed in Section 2.1, the Cistercians were mediators of technological change, possibly driven by the
desire to free up time for prayer. In addition, the principle that abbots from all Cistercian monasteries
had to congregate annually at Cîteaux (the founding monastery) may have implied that new successful
innovations (even those not originally due to the Cistercians themselves) were quickly communicated and
diﬀused. While we view technological change as a plausible consequence of the values proliferated by the
Cistercians, it cannot be ruled out a priori that innovations are in fact the full story. That is, perhaps the
legacy left by the Cistercians was technological, and not cultural.
The question is therefore whether the following causal chain, ignoring any cultural eﬀects, may in fact
account for our previous findings:
Cistercians ⇒ Technology ⇒ Technology+ ⇒ Population density+ 
A theoretical diﬃculty with this account of our findings above is that the Cistercian impact exhibits
such strong persistence. The Monasteries were all dissolved during the fourth decade of the 16th century;
nevertheless, we find an eﬀect on population growth reaching as far as the beginning of the 19th century.
This requires strong persistence in technology across counties, as reflected in the postulated link between
Technology and Technology+ . Recent empirical evidence does in fact suggest that 20th century cross-
country technology diﬀusion may be slow when the intensive margin is considered.30 However, by any
stretch of imagination, it seems hard believe that pre-industrial technological diﬀusion within a country could
proceed suﬃciently slow so as to account for our results spanning several centuries after the Dissolution of
the Monasteries, without some additional source of persistence. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the issue
in some detail.
As a first exercise we attempt to control for a key technology that the Cistercians were renowned for
diﬀusing and improving: watermills. If “technology” itself is the main “story”, while the cultural channel
which we have emphasized all along is largely irrelevant, one would expect the impact of the Cistercian
presence to disappear (or at least diminish in a major way) once we control for the intensity of watermills
at the county level.
We obtained data on the location of watermills during the 14th century from Campbell and Bartley
(2007). Naturally, watermills are seldom preserved across the centuries. Hence, the data originates from
records of so-called inquisitions post mortem (IPM) following the passing of lay tenants in chief of the Crown.
Specifically, we assign intensity of watermill presence according to the fraction of the IPMs where watermills
are mentioned. It should be understood that this is a very crude proxy for the presence of watermills
30That is, diﬀusion appears to be slow when one does not simply consider whether a particular technology is present or not
(the extensive margin), but rather focus on the intensity of its use in an area. See Comin et al. (2008).
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in local areas; in particular, it excludes watermills belonging to the Church. Nevertheless, if Cistercians
were instrumental in increasing the intensity of this important technology prior to the Dissolution of the
Monasteries, this variable may still serve as a useful proxy for this technology dimension.
Table 7 shows the eﬀect of introducing watermills. Columns 1-9 reproduce Table 3 with watermill intensity
as an added control, whereas column 10 shows the results when all controls, including watermills, are added
simultaneously. The recurring theme of the table is that the impact from Cistercian presence is unaﬀected
by the inclusion of the intensity of watermill presence. In fact, comparing the results of Table 7 to those of
Table 3 makes clear that the OLS estimate from Cistercian presence is essentially unaltered by the inclusion
of watermills. This is fully consistent with the cultural theory proposed above, while hard to reconcile with
the notion that technological change in itself accounts for the relationship between Cistercian presence and
growth.
[Table 7 about here]
An alternative interpretation of these results is that our measure of technology, watermills, is simply too
crude and imprecisely recorded. Hence, in an eﬀort to pursue the matter a bit further, we introduce human
capital. The motivation is twofold. First, it seems possible that if the Cistercians managed to instigate
technological change during their tenure then this may have increased the return to skill accumulation in the
local area. By accounting for the end result of early technological change, i.e. human capital accumulation,
we may implicitly be controlling for early technological change more fully than what is admitted by the
watermill control. Second, if initial technological change stimulated early human capital accumulation then
the latter could be the source of persistence. Perhaps what our results above are suggesting is the following
causal chain:
Cistercians ⇒ Technology ⇒Skill accumulation+ ⇒Population density+ 
That is, perhaps Cistercian presence stimulated early technological change, which led to comparative diﬀer-
ences in the speed of skill accumulation in the centuries following the Dissolution of the Monasteries. Insofar
as early skill accumulation led to greater earnings it could have worked to elevate population density during
the ensuing centuries, prior to the demographic transition. Still, human capital accumulation might also
lead to slower population growth due to the presence of a quantity-quality trade-oﬀ (e.g., Galor and Weil,
2000). Whether the above chain motivates our findings is an empirical matter. Accordingly, by including
measures of historical human capital accumulation alongside Cistercian presence we may try to gauge the
viability of the cultural change hypothesis.
We obtained data on county-level literacy rates from Hechter (2001). The earliest year from which data
on literacy rates is available is 1851. Although this is after the “closing” of our observation window on
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population growth we hope that 1851 is a sensible proxy for comparative diﬀerences across English countries
circa 1800 as well. Notice that by introducing the literacy rate at the end of the period we are in eﬀect
proxying the rate of human capital accumulation over the preceding centuries, assuming literacy rates were
close to zero in 1377. Naturally, one might expect most of this change to have occurred towards the end of
the period in question.
Table 8 provides the results from adding the literacy rate. In column 1 we add literacy to our baseline
specification which involves (aside from the Cistercian share) the total number of religious houses, initial
population density, and land quality. As can readily be seen, the Cistercian share remains significant in spite
of the human capital control.
[Table 8 about here]
Human capital enters with a negative sign, suggesting that areas where individuals invested relatively
more in their children, at least in terms of basic reading and writing skills, were the areas with the slowest
growth in population between 1377 and 1801. This is consistent with an operative quantity-quality trade-
oﬀ. Naturally, one cannot rule out that the correlation is due to reverse causality. That is, areas with
fast population growth may have been areas that later (in 1851) ended up with lower human capital levels.
Whatever the right interpretation, the main point is that controlling for human capital does not eliminate
the significance of the Cistercian share. The basic pattern from the first column is repeated when we add our
additional controls one by one, and when we add all controls simultaneously. In every case the Cistercian
share remains significant at conventional levels of significance, and the size of the point estimate appears
stable. These results are consistent with the theory advanced above, which proposes that the Cistercian
influence on Pre-industrial growth in England did not manifest itself through accelerated human capital
accumulation but rather via cultural change.
Finally, observe that the results reported in Table 8 also suggest that the impact of Cistercian presence
cannot be accounted for by the mechanism featured in Becker and Woessmann (2009): The lasting impact of
the Cistercians does not seem to have involved all the same proximate sources of growth as Protestantism.
Human capital accumulation is unlikely to be part of the story in the present case.
4 Concluding Remarks
The present paper documents that Cistercian monks left a persistent imprint on long-run comparative de-
velopment across English counties during the pre-industrial era. In counties with greater Cistercian presence
population growth was faster during the period 1377-1801, suggesting that the Cistercians stimulated local
earnings. The remarkable aspect of this finding is that the Catholic monasteries were dissolved by 1540.
Hence the influence from the Order was felt more than 300 years after they had disappeared from England.
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These results are robust to a considerable number of controls for productivity, and our IV estimates suggest
the correlation can be given a casual interpretation.
We have also oﬀered a potential explanation for these facts, namely that the Cistercians ignited a process
of growth through cultural change. That is, a gradual change in local populations in terms of taste for thrift
and hard work; much like what Max Weber suggested was the end result of the Protestant Reformation. We
believe this theoretical explanation is plausible for two reasons. First, a cultural concordance between the
Cistercians and the Protestants, in the dimensions of work ethic and thrift, has already been observed by
several scholars including Weber himself. Second, the cultural explanation has the virtue of being able to
plausibly account for the long-term persistency of Cistercian influence on growth. Consistent with the cultural
mechanism we find, using data from the World Value Survey, that regions in England which historically were
influenced relatively more by the Cistercians tend to have populations with greater taste for hard work and
thrift today.
Naturally, there are other potentially viable explanations beyond cultural change. For instance, we
have examined whether the above facts alternatively can be accounted for by technology, human capital or
international trade. While all three channels may be plausible alternatives to the cultural mechanism, we
find that none of them are able to account for the Cistercians influence in the data. As a result, we are led
to the conclusion that the long term Cistercian impact was most likely caused by a change in cultural values,
which stimulated earnings at the local level. Hence, our research suggest that the original Weber thesis,
stressing the importance of cultural values like hard work and thrift to economic growth, holds considerable
explanatory power with respect to the pre-industrial growth record of England.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i): Note first that  Q  iﬀ  R (1 + ). Consequently, with  ≤  we have by (4) that  = 1 in
which case (7) gives that +1 = . With    we have that  =  . Inserting this, the appropriate
∗ from (4), and equation (5) into equation (7) then gives +1 = 11+ 1 1−
(ii): When  ≤  we have that +1 =  which cannot cross the 45-degree line in ( +1)-space
since   1 However, when    0 ()  0 00 ()  0 and lim→∞0 () = 0 This ensures
a unique and globally stable steady state. The steady state population, ∗ is found by solving ∗ =
1
1+
1
 (∗)1− for ∗.
(iii): Steady state income per capita is obtained by inserting steady state population, ∗ and ∗ = 11+
into (6). ¥
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Follows from diﬀerentiating the relevant expression from Lemma 1. ¥
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) The law of motion for the first two regimes follows from straightforward application of Lemma 1 to the
two groups: 1 and 2. The law of motion for the final regime, ¯2   is obtained as follows. The time
path for group size is given by
+1 = 1
1 + 
1
   = 1 2
Using  = 1 + 2 and the production function, we obtain after some rearrangements
+1 =
∙ 1 − 2
(1 + 1) (1 + 2)
2
 +
1
1 + 1
¸
1

 1− (10)
Observe now that 2 = (1 + 12)−1  Since the laws of motions for the individual groups are
symmetrical, save for the value of , we have that 1+12+1 = [(1 + 2)  (1 + 1)]12 Solving
this diﬀerence equation yields 12 =
³
1+2
1+1
´ 1020. Substituting this solution into the law of
motion for , yields the expression stated in the Lemma.
(ii) Let group  grows according to
+1 =  (11)
where   = 1 2 equals  or 11+ 1 depending on 
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The law of motion for total population is given as 1+1 + 2+1 = 11 +22 and so
+1
 = 1
µ
1− 2
¶
+22 ⇔
+1
 = 1 + (2 −1)
2
  (12)
Note also that 2 =
³
1 + 12
´−1 ≡ 11+  We can therefore write (12) as
+1
 = 1 +
2 −1
1 +   (13)
Finally, note that by (11) we have
+1 = 12  (14)
where we recall that 1 and 2 are functions of 
In this setting, a steady state is a pair (∗ ∗) such that 0  ∗ = +1 =  and +1 =  = ∗, with
0 ≤ ∗ ≤ 1 and where (∗ ∗) fulfills equations (13), (14).
We need to consider existence of a steady state in the three regimes stated in the lemma.
Case I:   ¯1, where (it is recalled) ¯1 is defined as  (1) = (1 + 1) When 0    ¯1, 1 = 
and 2 = . Hence, relative group size (and thus 2 ) is constant. But the aggregate population is rising,
since (inserting into (13)) +1 =   1 Accordingly, for   ¯1 there does not exist a steady state with
+1 =  = ∗ and ∗ fulfilling (13).
Case II. 0  ¯1 ≤   ¯2, with ¯2 is defined as  ¡¯2¢ = (1 + 2) Note that ¯2  ¯1 since
2  1 Relative group size in this interval.
+1 = 12 =
1
1+1
1

  (15)
while aggregate growth is given by (13).
Working towards a contradiction, assume that a steady state exist. This requires (from (13)) that
1 = 1 (∗) + (2 (∗)−1 (∗)) 1
1 + ∗ 
or, since ¯1 ≤   ¯2,
1− 11+1 1 (∗)
− 11+1 1 (∗)
=
1
1 + ∗  (16)
That is, existence requires constancy of relative group size ∗. But this demands, from (15), that
 = 1
1 + 1
1
  (
∗) 
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which contradicts 0 ≤ ∗ ≤ 1 as seen from (16). Hence, a steady state cannot exist in the interval
0  ¯1 ≤   ¯2
Case III. ¯2   Observe that 0  0 for 10 20  0. This follows from diﬀerentiation and noting
that 2  1 Next, note that lim→∞
µ
1 +
³
1+2
1+1
´ 10
20
¶−1
= 1 implying lim→∞ = 11+2 1 1−.
Given this result and continuity of (  ), the same considerations as those laid out in the proof of Lemma
1 leads to existence and uniqueness of the steady state.¥
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Before cultural mutation occurs the law of motion for population size is given by Lemma 1, with  = 1.
After the change, the law of motion is given in Lemma 2. Since 2  1 Proposition 2 follows from
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2.¥
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Table 1: Frequency distribution of monastic orders Number Share of total
Benedictine monks 239 30.8
Augustinian canons 208 26.8
Benedictine nuns 77 9.9
Cistercian monks 70 9.0
Premonstratensian canons 37 4.8
Cluniac monks 34 4.4
Cistercian nuns 28 3.6
Augustinian canonesses 24 3.1
Gilbertine canons 15 1.9
Trinitarian brothers 10 1.3
Gilbertine canons & nuns 9 1.2
Carthusian monks 8 1.0
Fontevraud nuns 3 0.4
Grandmontine monks 3 0.4
Premonstratensian canonesses 3 0.4
Bonhommes brothers 2 0.3
Cluniac nuns 2 0.3
Brigettine nuns & brothers 1 0.1
Fontevraud monks 1 0.1
Gilbertine nuns 1 0.1
unknown monks or brothers 1 0.1
Total 776 100.0
Table 2a: Summary statistics Obs Mean Std. Min Max
cistercianshare 40 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.25
relhouses 40 19.03 12.93 2.00 73.00
popdens1377 40 31.55 11.83 8.98 52.98
popdens1801 40 60.45 24.82 20.92 143.77
agrquality1_2 40 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.73
riverstream 40 0.41 0.29 0.06 1.09
rivershare 40 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.18
streamshare 40 0.30 0.27 0.01 0.91
area 40 3256.94 1623.37 392.20 7423.75
Table 2b: Correlation matrix
cistercianshare 1
relhouses 0.0134 1
popdens1377 -0.2791 0.3091 1
popdens1801 0.3161 -0.1644 -0.0579 1
agrquality1_2 -0.1234 0.2460 0.4287 -0.2149 1
riverstream 0.0127 -0.1391 -0.6152 -0.1460 -0.2602 1
rivershare 0.1589 -0.1271 -0.4816 -0.0063 -0.2092 0.6345 1
streamshare -0.0044 -0.1341 -0.6025 -0.1553 -0.2542 0.9962 0.5644 1
area 0.2625 0.6603 -0.2802 -0.0381 -0.0865 0.3191 0.2011 0.3181
Table 3: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
logpopdens1377 -0.614*** -0.694*** -0.606*** -0.700*** -0.438** -0.715*** -0.615*** -0.635*** -0.674*** -0.729***
(0.171) (0.207) (0.186) (0.206) (0.173) (0.172) (0.169) (0.155) (0.160) (0.249)
cistercianshare 1.934** 1.802** 1.931** 1.779** 1.751** 1.911** 1.982** 2.074** 1.666* 1.773*
(0.887) (0.825) (0.916) (0.827) (0.798) (0.847) (0.927) (0.876) (0.852) (0.968)
relhouses -0.007* -0.007+ -0.007* -0.006+ -0.017*** -0.005 -0.007* -0.008** -0.006* -0.014**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
agrquality1_2 -0.634* -0.633* -0.634* -0.632* -0.536* -0.543* -0.631* -0.488+ -0.675** -0.279
(0.313) (0.321) (0.315) (0.320) (0.297) (0.288) (0.326) (0.301) (0.326) (0.324)
riverstream -0.180
(0.233)
rivershare 0.267 1.481
(1.940) (1.987)
streamshare -0.208 -0.473
(0.247) (0.293)
logarea 0.303** 0.280
(0.113) (0.176)
augustinianshare 0.771 0.970
(0.541) (0.589)
benedictineshare 0.146 0.629
(0.383) (0.479)
cluniacshare 2.465** 1.848
(1.159) (1.486)
premonshare -0.674 0.245
(0.847) (1.088)
Constant 2.799*** 3.148*** 2.742*** 3.158*** -0.011 2.878*** 2.754*** 2.744*** 3.060*** 0.472
(0.587) (0.742) (0.735) (0.724) (1.257) (0.548) (0.631) (0.542) (0.529) (2.08)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.641 0.646 0.641 0.647 0.676 0.667 0.642 0.683 0.650 0.756
Dependent variable : dlogpop1377_1801
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. In column 10, riverstream is omitted due to perfect multicollinearity.
Table 4: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
logpopdens1377 -0.482** -0.606** -0.460* -0.619** -0.124 -0.521** -0.469* -0.287 -0.519* -0.359
(0.235) (0.290) (0.267) (0.287) (0.266) (0.233) (0.232) (0.248) (0.282) (0.339)
cistercianshare 1.977* 1.849* 1.975* 1.823* 1.810** 1.662* 1.947+ 2.214** 1.659* 1.741
(1.078) (1.039) (1.112) (1.044) (0.825) (0.859) (1.176) (0.958) (0.876) (1.303)
relhouses -0.006* -0.006+ -0.006+ -0.006+ -0.023*** -0.003 -0.006* -0.007** -0.005 -0.015*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
agrquality1_2 -0.682* -0.640* -0.671* -0.626+ -0.694** -0.519 -0.665* -0.471 -0.717* -0.309
(0.350) (0.366) (0.352) (0.368) (0.299) (0.390) (0.340) (0.426) (0.361) (0.586)
riverstream -0.158
(0.286)
rivershare 0.362 1.294
(2.128) (2.204)
streamshare -0.188 -0.329
(0.309) (0.278)
logarea 0.518*** 0.328
(0.182) (0.237)
augustinianshare 1.137* 1.056
(0.564) (0.835)
benedictineshare -0.154 0.475
(0.487) (0.649)
cluniacshare 3.238* 1.853
(1.653) (1.861)
premonshare -0.524 0.342
(1.374) (1.665)
Constant 2.295** 2.787** 2.169* 2.815** -2.649 1.986* 2.288** 1.372 2.462** -1.274
(0.971) (1.153) (1.200) (1.126) (2.151) (0.977) (0.980) (1.072) (1.152) (2.709)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test, H0: Reg. dummies = 0 (p-val) 0.487 0.658 0.510 0.668 0.070 0.374 0.558 0.354 0.616 0.562
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.678 0.681 0.679 0.682 0.750 0.723 0.680 0.737 0.682 0.799
Dependent variable : dlogpop1377_1801
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, *, + indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15%, respectively. In column 10, riverstream is omitted due to perfect multicollinearity.
Table 5: IV (Limited Information Maximum Likelihood) estimation
IV
(1) (2) (3)
Second stage
cistercianshare 4.77** 3.37** 2.57**
-2.07 (1.54) (1.19)
First stage
Rforest 0.08** 0.10*** 0.07**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
logpopdens1300  - 0.14**  - 0.17**  - 0.20***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
First stage F-static 4.81 15.68 7.49
Hansen J-stat (p-value) 0.55 0.46 0.75
Additional Controls logpopdens1377 All Baseline All controls
Observations 40 40 40
Dependent variable : dlogpop1377_1801
Dependent variable: cistercianshare
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and
10%, respectively. All regressions include a constant. "Baseline controls" is controls from Table 3,
Column 1: logpopdens1377, religious houses and agricultural land quality. "All controls" involve all the
controls featured in Table 3: logpopdens1377, religious houses (total), agricultural land quality,
rivershare, streamshare, logarea, augustinianshare, clunicshare, and premonshare. To avoid
multicollinarity river and stream shares are controled for seperately, while the combined variable
"riverstream" is ignored.
Table 6: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
cistercianshare 1.92** 1.77** 1.92** 1.74** 1.77** 1.90** 1.97** 2.08** 1.66* 2.02*
(0.88) (0.80) (0.91) (0.80) (0.82) (0.85) (0.92) (0.89) (0.87) (1.05)
coastal dummy 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Controls All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All controls
 + riverstream  + rivershare  + streamshare  + logarea  + augustinianshare  + benedictineshare  + cluniacshare  + premonshare
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.65 0.78
Dependent variable : dlogpop1377_1801
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include a constant. "Baseline controls" are the controls from Table 3, Column 1:
logpopdens1377, religious houses, and agricultural land quality. "All controls" means all the controls featured in Table 3: logpopdens1377, religious houses, agricultural land quality, rivershare, streamshare, logarea,
augstinianshare, benedictineshare, cluniacshare, and premonshare.
Trade
Table 7: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) [10]
cistercianshare 1.92** 1.78** 1.92** 1.76** 1.75** 1.90** 1.98** 2.07** 1.58* 1.79*
(0.89) (0.83) (0.91) (0.83) (0.82) (0.85) (0.91) (0.90) (0.82) (1.00)
watermills 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.30 0.05 0.39 -0.18
(0.64) (0.83) (0.67) (0.65) (0.66) (65) (0.70) (0.61) (0.64) (0.60)
Controls All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All controls
 + riverstream  + rivershare  + streamshare  + logarea  + augustinianshare  + Benedictineshare  + cluniacshare  + premonshare
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.76
Dependent variable : dlogpop1377_1801
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include a constant. "Baseline controls" are the controls from Table 3, Column 1:
logpopdens1377, religious houses and agricultural land quality. "All controls" means all the controls featured in Table 3: logpopdens1377, religious houses and agricultural land quality, rivershare, streamshare, logarea,
augstinianshare, benedictineshare, clunyshare, and premonshare.
Technology
Table 8: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
cistercianshare 1.64** 1.58** 1.64** 1.58* 1.53** 1.61** 1.64* 1.79** 1.57* 1.76**
(0.79) (0.79) (0.79)  (0.79) (0.70) (0.76) (0.84) (0.83) (0.79) (0.82)
literacy1851  -  1.93**  - 1.86**  - 1.93**  - 1.86**  - 1.94**  - 1.96**  - 1.93**  -  1.64* -1.84*  - 1.69*
(0.91) (0.88) (0.94) (0.88) (0.80) (0.93)  (0.94) (0.83) (1.07) (0.97)
Controls All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All Baseline All controls
 + riverstream  + rivershare  + streamshare  + logarea  + augustinianshare  + benedictineshare  + cluniacshare  + premonshare
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.77
Dependent variable : dlogpop1377_1801
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include a constant. "Baseline controls" are the controls from Table 3, Column 1:
logpopdens1377, religious houses, and agricultural land quality. "All controls" means all the controls featured in Table 3: logpopdens1377, religious houses, agricultural land quality, rivershare, streamshare, logarea,
augstinianshare, benedictineshare, cluniacshare, and premonshare.
Human capital
